We are pleased to present the thematic issue on the Eastern Mediterranean in Volume 70, Issue 3 of Comparative Southeast European Studies. This special section has been guest-edited by Professor Heinz-Jürgen Axt, an esteemed scholar whose academic career spans decades of research and publication in the fields of European integration, EU enlargement, structural policy, and the political dynamics of Southeast Europe — with particular focus on Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus.
At the time of this issue’s preparation, Professor Axt was serving as an emeritus professor at the Institute of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen, and as a visiting professor at the European Institute of Advanced Behavioural Management, Saarland University. He also previously held the position of Vice President at the Southeast Europe Association in Munich.
As the editor of this special section, Professor Axt not only curated the collection of articles submitted on the topic of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and the region’s complex entanglements with global powers, but also provided a comprehensive editorial review and assessment of each contribution.
His introductory essay offers a critical overview of the geopolitical significance of the Eastern Mediterranean, reflecting on how the discovery and exploitation of offshore energy reserves have transformed regional dynamics and attracted the strategic attention of major international actors. In a time marked by shifting alliances and global energy crises, this issue aims to deepen our understanding of the interplay between regional tensions and broader international frameworks.
We are grateful to Professor Axt for his invaluable contribution and invite readers to engage with the diverse perspectives and analyses offered in this timely and thought-provoking collection.
Heinz-Jürgen Axt*
Conflicts and Global Powers in the Eastern
Mediterranean. An Introduction
Abstract: Conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean have a long history, and recently supposed energy reserves have fuelled confrontations. Many studies are available that mainly analyse the strategies of the littoral states of the Mediterranean. This special issue enlarges the perspective by also including the global powers the EU, the United
States, Russia, and China in the analysis. The role of the regional power Turkey is also in focus here. Importantly, Russia’s war against Ukraine must be taken into account. Since the Russian president has been using gas as a weapon and trying to put pressure on Europe in particular, the relevance of the energy reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean must be reassessed. After the end of the Cold War, the actors on the global political level promised a rule-based world order. This promise has been severely challenged, however, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine which makes it necessary to reassess the relations between the global powers and the Mediterranean countries.
Keywords: Eastern Mediterranean, conflicts, energy, global powers, Russia’s war
against Ukraine
A “turning point” (Zeitenwende) occurred in Europe on 24 February 2022. Whereas geostrategic disputes over zones of influence, until then, concerned areas such as the economy, finance, energy, or technology, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine revealed that Russian president Vladimir Putin does not shy away from using military means, not only in Georgia or Syria but also in Europe. This was preceded by Russian support for the insurgents in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. Russia thus destroyed the world order that had been established since the end of the Cold War. The democratisation of Ukraine was to be reversed. When Russia prepared its war of aggression, it assumed that the West was weak, that transatlantic cooperation was fragile, and that the European Union (EU) was divided. According to the Russian reading, there were only three world powers: the United States (US), Russia and China. The EU was not included among them. But Russia may have miscalculated: Moscow’s offensive action has pushed back divergences of interest in the EU, strengthened the will to be ready for defence, and consolidated transatlantic cooperation.
This thematic section deals with the question of what interests the global powers are pursuing in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the recent past, the dispute over supposed energy sources has become more heated and old rivalries have resurfaced. The EU, the US, Russia, and China are discussed. A study on Turkey rounds off the analysis. As guest editor, I invited two scholars to write a paper on Greece, but neither delivered. When examining the interests and ambitions of the global powers, the changed world situation due to Russia’s war on the Ukraine must be considered. As far as possible, the authors were able to take the new situation into account, knowing that some assessments would have to remain provisional.
Conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean have a long history. Back in the 1950s and 1970s, Greece and Turkey were at odds regarding the delimitation of maritime zones, but these conflicts appear to have been forgotten by the public perception recently. They were not taken note of again until Turkey and Libya agreed in 2019 on the division of maritime zones of influence. Greece and Cyprus saw their rights violated. Although the initial issue was the exploration and exploitation of energy resources, a violent eruption of clashes cannot be ruled out. Research ships are accompanied by warships, so collisions and military incidents could quickly lead to an escalation of conflicts.
In recent years, scholars focussed on the rivalries between the Mediterranean states, disregarding the interests and strategies of global actors. Today, however, conflicts must be analysed in the greater context of the changing world order. That is why this special issue aims to clarify the interests of the global powers European Union, United States, Russia, and China in the Eastern Mediterranean: Of what type are their interests? To which extent are they interested in energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean? Is the region of strategic value, and if yes, what kind? Do the global powers side with specific Mediterranean states? Are they willing to intervene, or would they rather contain any conflicts? Could it be that the focus of global political actors is shifting entirely to the Pacific region, where China’s rise originated and where the US intends to contain it? Aside from the global powers, what are the intentions of regional powers? A global power is defined as a state that has significant influence in international affairs based on the projection of (military) power, while a regional power has the capacity to project power but only over a region (Kegley and Wittkopf 2000). Turkey is perceived to be a regional power.
When I discuss the role and strategies of global powers in this introduction, one might get the idea that this is based on the theory of realism from the academic teaching of international relations (Morgenthau 1954). This is not the case. Rather, an empirical–analytical approach open to different theories is pursued. Realism assumes that, in the anarchy of the world of states, where there is no form of world government, states are not satisfied with the given amount of power but strive for hegemony for security reasons. The deficient nature of the theory of realism has recently been demonstrated by the assessment of Russia’s war against Ukraine by the American political scientist John J. Mearsheimer. Already in 2014 and again now in 2022, he not only interpreted Russia’s war against Ukraine as a consequence of NATO’s push to the east but also granted Russia the right to claim a sphere of influence for itself at the expense of the former states of the Soviet Union. This leaves Ukraine with nothing more than only the role of a buffer between the West and Russia (Mearsheimer 2014; Mearsheimer 2022). That Ukraine should determine its own path of development towards a democratic polity or towards becoming a satellite state dependent on Russia cannot be reconciled with the basic assumptions of realism. As the alternative model to realism, liberalism postulates that the anarchy of the world of states can be contained by negotiations, agreements, and international institutions (Axt 2022).
Disputed Maritime Zones as a Casus Belli
The Eastern Mediterranean is a region of deep-rooted conflicts. The littoral states Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, and Libya disagree on their maritime rights to exploit energy resources. Moreover, historical memories and narratives of national sovereignty are competing; frozen conflicts prevent cooperation in cases of common interest. Conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean concern energy resources; maritime rights disunite Greece and Turkey as well as Cyprus and Turkey. These states are at odds with each other regarding sovereignty, just like Turkey and Syria, Lebanon, and Israel as well as Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (Axt 2021).
Studies of international relations differentiate between various types of conflicts: ethnic, religious, ideological, territorial, governmental, or economic ones (Axt, Schwarz, and Wiegand 2008, 43–5). Conflicts in Syria, Iraq, or Libya might be understood as governmental, whereas the Israeli–Palestine conflict has strong elements of a territorial and religious type. Looking at the littoral states of the Eastern Mediterranean, economic reasons—and mainly energy resources—play a predominant role in the conflicts existing there: energy resources are in great demand in the Eastern Mediterranean. Only Libya and, to a smaller extent, Egypt are net energy exporters as they produce more energy than they consume. Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, and Israel are net energy importers (Schenk et al. 2010). Given the high energy dependency of countries in the Eastern Mediterranean, it is relevant for the states involved what they declare as their own maritime zones or, more precisely, “exclusive economic zones” (EEZ). In these zones, the coastal states have sovereign rights for exploring and exploiting as well as conserving and managing the natural resources. Currently, three clusters of conflict can be identified in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The first cluster is a rather new one. The conflict was fuelled by Turkey and Libya when both countries signed an agreement in late 2019 on the delimitation of maritime zones to exploit energy resources (Axt 2021). The demarcation of maritime zones provided Turkey and Libya with the exclusive right to exploit natural resources in these zones. Greece and Cyprus complained that the delimitation of the maritime zones was carried out at the expense of a third party as the memorandum claims maritime zones for Turkey near the Greek islands of Dodecanes and Crete in an area that Greece defines as its own exclusive economic zone. Moreover, Turkey intervened in the military confrontation in Libya between the former government of prime minister Fayez Mustafa al-Sarraj on the one hand and the warlord field marshal Khalifa Belqasim Haftar on the other hand. The second cluster of conflicts was sparked by the question whether islands have the right to claim exclusive economic zones (United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of December 1982, 40–9). This question is relevant especially with respect to the Aegean Sea as numerous Greek islands here are located close to the Turkish mainland. Greece insists that islands have the legal right to declare maritime zones in which Greece is exclusively legitimated to carry out exploration and exploitation. Turkey opposes this view and argues that the Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean are based on the continental shelf of the Anatolian mainland, giving Turkey the right to engage in exploration and exploitation there (Siousiouras and Chrysochou 2014). This is relevant because energy resources, mainly natural gas, are supposed to exist in the region. Turkey sends exploration vessels to the region, an act Greece perceives as a violation of its own sovereign rights. Turkey does not hesitate to threaten casus belli if Greece extends its maritime zones. This concerns mainly the territorial waters where states confer full sovereignty.
The third cluster involves Cyprus, an island that has been divided into a Greek part (Republic of Cyprus) and a Turkish part (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) since 1974. The disagreement between Greece and Turkey cannot be understood without including Cyprus. Turkish research vessels undertake exploration work in areas southwest of the island which are declared as belonging to the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus. Here again, research vessels were accompanied by Turkish warships. In 2011, Turkey concluded an agreement with the representatives of the Turkish Cypriots and started exploration. The agreement stipulated an original continental shelf and an exclusive economic zone of 200 miles for Northern Cyprus, a step which must be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus (Axt 2012). The community of states accepts the Republic of Cyprus as the sole legal representation of the island. Cyprus and Greece have responded to this by jointly condemning Turkey’s research activity as “illegal”, and both Athens and Nicosia are urging their partners in the EU to impose sanctions on Turkey.
Finally, conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean are not confined to the littoral states but may end in “spill-over effects” on neighbouring regions, be it Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea region, the conflict-ridden Middle East (Iran, Iraq), or North African countries. Contentious matters far from the Eastern Mediterranean, such as the pipeline Nord Stream 2, an internally divided Russia, the EU, and the US too and further complicate their cooperation in the Mediterranean.
Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Conflict over Sources of No Value?
As we are faced with severe conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean, the irony of the whole situation could be that energy in the Eastern Mediterranean may prove to be a source of no value (Ellinas 2020). But Russia’s war against Ukraine may have fundamentally changed the assumptions. This concerns in particular the fact that Russia has moved to use gas as a weapon against the sanctions imposed on it by the West after its invasion of Ukraine. Leaving aside the question whether or not Russia continues to reliably supply gas, especially to EU countries, there have been and can continue to be four barriers to the exploitation of natural gas and oil in the Mediterranean. First, if conflicts between the Mediterranean states prevail, investment is regarded as too risky. Second, it is questionable whether the price for oil and gas from the Eastern Mediterranean will be competitive if other producers like Russia or the Arab states are able to offer energy to a lower price. The newly detected Sakarya gas field in the Black Sea will be able to offer significant energy resources for Turkey. Third, if Mediterranean energy is sold in markets across Europe, there are definite limitations if the EU is tied to its plan to drastically reduce the use of fossil energy. But many European countries need more gas as a bridging technology if they want to meet the climate targets and not rely on nuclear energy like France. Fourth, previously, energy scarcity was no longer considered to be a problem in the EU since gas pipelines like Nord Stream 1 and TurkStream 2 seemed to deliver enough energy from Russia to Europe. It was assumed that countries south and east of the Mediterranean would have a higher demand for gas, but not the EU. And finally, demand for green energy is increasing. Scientists and policy makers in Europe and in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean strongly recommend switching from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. Energy is thus not seen as the cause but as the trigger of the conflicts.
Some analysts believe that cooperation and the common exploitation of energy resources by the Mediterranean states would provide a chance to overcome differences. An analogy with the foundation of European integration has been introduced. Would a “Schuman Plan” for the Mediterranean, perhaps with support from international actors, help overcome disputes? What kind of input could global actors provide? Are they willing and able to initiate deconfliction, promote dialogue, trigger and support confidence building and cooperation among the Eastern Mediterranean countries? Because American and European companies are not controlled by governments, one could ask whether they could have a positive impact on pacifying the region? And what about Russia and China—does Russia focus on selling its own energy resources exclusively? And could China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” have a positive impact on cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean?
To date, no such perspective has appeared; rather, on the contrary, the littoral states are forming competing alliances. Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon, and Egypt demarcated their exclusive economic zones in 2010, excluding Turkey. Ankara became aware that its role as energy hub for the transport of Russian gas to Europe was endangered and thus concluded the memorandum with Libya. The memorandum enabled the Turkish marine to operate in Libyan waters and to establish an invisible wall that could block the transport of gas via a pipeline from Cyprus to Europe (Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of National Accord-State of Libya 2019). Athens and Abu Dhabi have increased their signs of rapprochement. Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine established the EastMed Gas Forum on 16 January 2020 with its headquarters located in Cairo. France officially requested to join, and the US announced that it would be a permanent observer. Also, in January 2020, Greece, Israel and Cyprus signed a joint agreement to launch an East Mediterranean pipeline to pump gas to Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean. Although it is questionable whether such a pipeline is a realistic project, it shows that Turkey is excluded from the increased collaboration between the Mediterranean states. Athens drew closer to Israel and the United Arab Emirates. In May 2021, a highranking Turkish delegation paid a visit to Cairo to improve bilateral relations. After the military coup against the Islamist government in 2013, relations with Turkey had cooled down and became even hostile. Now it seems possible that diplomatic relations could restart.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represents a watershed not only in security policy but also in energy policy. If I argue in this introduction that gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean are difficult to develop and market, Russia’s war against Ukraine may result in course corrections. Demand for energy to replace supplies from Russia has increased. Already during the preparation for war, the new situation became noticeable in the rise of gas and oil prices that affected not only private households but also industrial enterprises. Russia obviously wanted to demonstrate Europe’s vulnerability on the energy front in order to ward off massive sanctions against it.
The omnipresent argument that the way to reduce dependence on Russian gas and oil is to accelerate the development of renewable energy is basically undisputed. The question remains, however, at what pace, to what cost, and with what instruments progress will be made. There is little to suggest that rapid success is possible. The more this is confirmed in practice, the more previous calculations will be put to the test. The plan to use Russia’s gas as a bridging technology to promote the expansion of renewable energies is on shaky ground. To reduce dependence on energy imports from Russia, the life span of nuclear power plants and the phasing out of fossil fuels are already being discussed. Germany is also considering postponing its phasing out of coal production.
What consequences does this have for the energy sources suspected in the Eastern Mediterranean? The exploitation of gas resources may become more profitable if this energy is no longer exposed to price competition with suppliers from Russia. The EU may feel compelled to reactivate its original, but lately not vigorously pursued, support for the exploitation of Mediterranean gas. The article by Emile Badarin and Tobias Schumacher in this issue provides more information about the EU’s financial assistance for the “Project of Common Interest” (PCI) in the framework of the Southern Gas Corridor project. If, despite the changed world situation, the transport of gas via pipelines still proves to be problematic, then the transport of gas as LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) from the Mediterranean may well become attractive because there is growing support in the EU for using this technology. Transport capacities and port facilities are to be expanded. But as things develop, previous calculations may become obsolete. Gas from the Mediterranean may then have a new future and competition will increase to secure access to these energy sources. What applies to the Eastern Mediterranean also applies in other parts of Europe. The Netherlands is discussing—despite the associated risk of earthquakes—whether to postpone its phasing out of gas production that it had agreed for the end of 2022 (Kotkamp 2022).
A Rule-Based World Order: Decline or Revival of the West?
Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean should not be perceived in isolation but must be classified in the global context. The historical development in Europe since the end of the Second World War can be divided into three phases. The first phase was the Cold War, in which deterrence dominated. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975 introduced the second phase, in which detente prevailed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This phase came to ´ an end with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The first two phases can be described with reference to the Eastern Mediterranean as follows. Bipolarity after 1945 was based on deterrence. The Western and the Eastern blocs were convinced that there would be no winners in a nuclear war. Superpowers confined themselves to waging surrogate wars, such as Korea (1950–1953), Vietnam (1955–1975), or Afghanistan (1979–1989).
Bipolarity became more stable when the antagonising blocs learned that establishing mutual binding rules and institutions was advantageous for both sides. In 1795, in his work Perpetual Peace (Zum Ewigen Frieden), Immanuel Kant developed the idea that an order of peace would be possible if the world of states agreed on common legal norms and corresponding institutions (Kant 2003). The United Nations, founded in 1945, took up these principles by committing the signatory states to the renunciation of violence and respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of other states. Placing law above force—, that was Kant’s vision. It was possible to establish a universally respected normative principle, but it did not fundamentally define international relations. The right of veto granted to the victorious powers of World War II in the Permanent Security Council of the United Nations allowed selfinterest to prevail. Even if not in practice, central principles of regulated conflict resolution were nevertheless enshrined, which states could invoke and citizens could use to admonish leaders. A world order would be ideal if it were both rulebased and multilateral.
The concerns of the United Nations were taken up in Europe in 1975 with the Conference on Security and Cooperation. The Soviet Union and the West were able to agree on a “package deal”. While the recognition of postwar borders was central for the Soviet Union and its allies, for the West it was renunciation of force and a commitment to human rights. Even though the number of the participating states grew and the institutions expanded, the CSCE was not able to develop into a system of collective security in the sense of the philosophical idealism that was the basis of Immanuel Kant’s vision. The power-based concept of realism remains dominant, and states follow their self-interest and strive for hegemony for security reasons.
The existence of the antagonising military blocks did not allow the development of mechanisms and instruments for a peaceful settlement of conflicts. But the CSCE was an arrangement of high political relevance during the times of the Cold War (Axt 1993). On condition of the willingness of participants and especially the superpowers, negotiations addressed issues of security, disarmament, human rights, confidence-building measures, economic cooperation, and human dimension. When heads of state met in November 1990 in Paris to agree on the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe”, expectations were high that peace, mutual understanding, and progress could be secured in post-Cold War Europe. Then, in 1995, the CSCE was transferred to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as a permanent conference of states to serve as a regional security organisation under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.
After the end of the Cold War, the NATO–Russia Founding Act was signed in 1997 to establish a partnership and overcome mutual mistrust. The changes since the end of the Cold War were recognised, a common area of stability was to be created through the renunciation of violence, and there was to be respect for the sovereignty and self-determination of the peoples (Velickovic 2009). A NATO– Russia Council was to help solve problems in the event of tension. But when the NATO countries and Russia became increasingly estranged from each other, accused each other of breaches of contract, and pushed ahead with arms programmes instead of disarmament and abandoned arms control, the NATO–Russia Council could not overcome the tensions through the agreed rules and mechanisms.
Efforts to establish a global security architecture have their roots in what is labelled the normative project of the West. The American Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789 enshrined human rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, democracy, and popular sovereignty (Winkler 2015, 15–8). From the United Nations to the NATO–Russia Founding Act, these principles have been transposed into East–West relations. The end of the Cold War nurtured the hope that the normative project of the West could become a supporting principle worldwide. The market economy and democracy were present in all relevant declarations as self-commitments. As we can observe today, the desire for freedom is bumping up against the reality of Russia’s imperialistic great power policy in countries like Ukraine or Georgia. In view of the conflicts and tensions flaring up in many corners of the globe and the rivalries between the global powers, one must be sceptical as to whether international relations will stabilise. In view of these aspects, the current world order is called multipolar, which is somewhat of a euphemism. A “world order without the West” (Weltordnung ohne den Westen), as described by the German politician Gernot Erler in his book in 2018, is a cause for concern. This is particularly evident in the fact that the two emerging powers, China and Russia, reject Western-style liberal democracy based on freedom, civil liberties, human rights, and civic participation and have established authoritarian presidential systems (Erler 2018, 147).
In recent years, the West has become a subject of debate and discussion. The hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 left a gap that prompted several questions: Can the EU fill the gap and even achieve strategic autonomy, or will Russia and China fill it? Is there any truth to the widespread narrative in China that the West is declining and the East is rising? Has the withdrawal from Afghanistan initiated by the US and driven forward single-handedly shaken the trust of the allies in American security guarantees? Has the EU therefore been left to its own devices, and can the EU act in a coherent and united way? Were the risks of local or regional conflicts still accurately assessed? Did intelligence services make reliable forecasts about the pace of the escalation of conflicts and shifts in the balance of power? To put it in a nutshell: Did the hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan mark farewell to the idea of the West in that universalist values of democracy, pluralism, tolerance, nation building, etc. cannot be implemented globally after all? Are we on the way to an absolute realpolitik that only knows its own interests and rejects multilateral action? If this is the case, then the conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean would be about nothing more than the politics of national interests and the will to act to reduce conflicts would dwindle. This is why it is crucially important that the questions pertaining to these conflicts are scrutinised with a view to the global powers.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has finally forced the third phase of the postwar order. The Russian president followed Carl von Clausewitz’ famous dictum that “war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means” (Clausewitz 1968). The fact that a democratic and liberal system was developing in a former state of the Soviet Union was perceived by Putin as a threat (Axt 2022) and ran counter to the Russian president’s imperial ambitions. So, on 24 February 2022, Russian tanks were given the order to march towards Ukraine. Russia obviously assumed that the West was too weak to oppose aggression. The hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan, the obsessive fixation of the US on China, and the divergence of interests between the EU states may have encouraged the Russian president to act.
But Russia may have miscalculated. The opposite of what Putin had expected has happened: the unity of the West has been strengthened, the transatlantic partnership has been reinforced, and intra-European differences have been pushed back. The West has proven capable of deterrence. Germany is a paradigmatic example of this. For a long time, the motto was that peace could only be achieved with Russia, that detente does not need deterrence. When it became clear ´ after the invasion of Ukraine that the Russian president had no interest in this, a radical change took place in Germany. Nothing makes this clearer than chancellor Olaf Scholz’s speech in the Bundestag on 27 February 2022. According to this speech, Germany wants to increase defence spending to more than 2% of the gross domestic product, a special fund of 100 billion euros is to be made available for the Bundeswehr, armed combat drones are to be acquired, anti-tank weapons and surface-to-air missiles are to be delivered to Ukraine, and joint European armament projects are to be accelerated (Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz, 27 February 2022). In the meantime, however, doubts are growing as to whether the German government will follow up its announcements with corresponding actions. Not only the German opposition, but also many EU partners, especially in Eastern Europe, are urging the Berlin government to act decisively, especially with regard to supporting Ukraine with the requested arms material.
A Region Dependent on the Global Powers?
A correct assessment of the interests of the global powers vis-à-vis the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean is possible only if their current state of mind and societal orientation is kept in view. This comprises both the economic and political situation and the aspirations of the leading elites as well as the actors of civil society. International politics reflects more than the concept of the world of states suggests, which is in the focus of the realism approach.
To be able to describe the interests of the global powers in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean, it makes sense to explain the mutual dependencies in more detail. In the 1970s, a discussion emerged in development policy and the study of international relations whether Third World Countries might not only be dependent on the industrialised nations, but whether one could speak rather of a relationship of interdependence. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye introduced into the academic debate the perspective that, in policy practice, the 1973 oil price crisis highlighted the extent to which industrialised oil-importing countries were dependent on producer countries (Keohane and Nye 1977). This paradigm can be applied with some benefit to the relationship of the Mediterranean countries to global powers. It can be assumed that mutual dependence stabilises relations between states. This assumption is undermined, however, when political leaders no longer make their decisions on the basis of rational-choice considerations and become incalculable, as it is the case with the Russian president currently.
Here an analogy can be made with the theory of neo-functionalism. In the 1960s and 1970s, the latter had assumed that European integration after 1945 had progressed automatically, as it were, by way of incrementalistic spill-over processes. The more integration proved to be beneficial for all participants, the more they were willing to surrender competences to a united Europe (Haas 1968). In reality, however, this development was already halted when the decidedly nationalist French president Charles de Gaulle practised the “empty chair policy” in 1965, which set back the integration process. Because the states of the European Economic Community (EEC) could not agree on an increase in prices for agricultural goods desired by France, the representative of France did not attend the meetings of the Council of Ministers for half a year (Bomberg, Peterson, and Stubb 2008, 33–5). The EEC was unable to make decisions. Scholars like Haas acknowledged this by revising their neo-functionalist approach (Haas 1975). With regard to the current relationship between Russia and the West, it can be stated that Western politicians had good arguments when they relied on interdependent relations with Russia—the West’s energy dependence on Russia and Russia’s technology dependence on the West—as having a stabilising effect. As an extremely nationalist, neo-imperialist and authoritarian political leader, however, president Putin became more and more powerful, this assumption proved to be wrong. This ultimately led to the war against Ukraine in 2022. Thus, while interdependence opens up prospects for stabilisation, it also has its limits.
So, what is the state of relations between the Mediterranean countries and the United States? If we only take the three adversaries Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, we find that Greece has traditionally been very dependent on the United States. This concerned the areas of domestic politics, the economy, and security. Immediately after World War II, when the civil war raged in Greece from 1946 to 1949, it was the US that curbed the “danger of communism” in domestic and military policy (Couloumbis and Iatridis 1980). The country’s economic reconstruction depended heavily on American support. This has changed since the European Union has become more involved in the country’s development on the one hand and the policy of detente has taken effect in terms of security policy, on the other. With the ´ collapse of the Soviet Union, the importance of Greece as part of the protective screen against the Soviet Union also declined. When the US began to perceive China as the greatest challenge, the importance of Greece in Washington’s security policy decreased. Athens became less dependent on the US, but it could hardly build a relationship of interdependence to its advantage.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has changed the mutual relations between the Mediterranean countries and the global powers, however. Relations with Russia have been fundamentally tested. The sanctions imposed by the West have been joined by Greece and Cyprus. All states are examining ways to reduce their dependence on Russian energy supplies. The Western defence alliance gained new appreciation, as did the EU, which was expected to provide active economic and financial support.
Now let us look at NATO. For the US, NATO was the central element for containing communism in the past as well as for exerting a moderating influence on the adversaries Greece and Turkey. As recently as 1995–1996, it was the US and NATO that were able to keep Athens and Ankara from a major military confrontation in the conflict over the small rocky island of Imia/Kardak (Axt, Schwarz, and Wiegand 2008, 177–8). A policy of equidistance by Washington from the adversaries made this possible. This ability of both the US and NATO to intervene in disputes between NATO members in the Mediterranean is unlikely to still be the case today. Athens is increasingly seeking alliances with Israel and the Gulf states, and Ankara’s relationship with the US has cooled considerably in the wake of the wars in the Middle East. Turkey accused the US of cooperating militarily in the Middle East with groups that, like the pro-Kurdish YPG (Yekîneyen Parastina Gel ˆ , People’s Defence Units), endangered Turkey’s security. Turkey feels it has too little support from the West but likes to limit the influence of the West in the areas it claims for itself (Bardakçı 2021). Where possible, Turkey seeks to use the US’s withdrawal from the Middle East to its own advantage. For Turkey’s increased selfconfidence, see the article by Mehmet Bardakçı in this thematic section. That Turkey relied on Russian missile technology—rather than American—damaged bilateral relations (Tol and Taşpınar 2019). So, Ankara reduced its dependence on the US, but it could not establish a reciprocal US dependence on Turkey. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s relationship with the West may become closer again (Seufert 2022). Turkey has good economic relations with both Russia and Ukraine. So, it is understandable that Turkey is offering to mediate between Russia and Ukraine (Malsin 2022). But Turkey has already taken its first steps against Russia: it has closed the Bosphorus and the Dadanelles Straits to naval ships, which was more of a symbolic act as Russian warships were already deployed. Turkey described the conflict as a war, contradicting the Russian narrative of a “special operation”. The Russian invasion was called unacceptable. Ankara’s rhetoric is that Turkey is a loyal member of NATO, but it has to take care of its national interests, and so it did not join in the Western economic sanctions. For geographical and historical reasons, Turkey does not want Moscow to regain control of Odessa and the Black Sea (see Zaur Gasimov’s contribution in this issue). It takes so little to resurrect the age-old rivalries between the Ottoman and Russian Empires.
While Turkey’s relations with the US have cooled over the past two decades, the Republic of Cyprus’ relations with the US have always been rather distanced (Laipson 1992). Although Washington and Nicosia feel committed to the same family of values, Cyprus has always gone its own way in security policy and did not join NATO (Kadritzke and Wagner 1976). Nicosia did not feel sufficiently supported by the US when it came to the “national question”, i.e. the division of the island and the rejection of Turkish claims against the Greek Cypriots. In the disputes over energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus seeks support less from the US than from the southern littoral states of the Eastern Mediterranean (Israel and Egypt), just like Greece. The Republic of Cyprus and Russia have political and financial ties, but the Cypriot parliament unanimously passed a resolution condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The fact that Russian tourists make up the second biggest group of tourists to Cyprus and that the island has the reputation of being a haven for Russian money did not stand in the way of that. For a long time, Cyprus was considered to be the “once highly-touted ‘offshore gateway’ for the Russian wealthy” (Adkisson 2013). In the past, doubts have repeatedly arisen as to whether Cyprus is not being too lenient on Russia. This was the case when Cyprus distanced itself from the EU sanctions against Russia over the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and when news spread in 2015 that Cyprus wanted to open its ports to Russian warships (Axt 2015a).
When it comes to Russia’s relations with the Mediterranean states, it can be noted that, as NATO members, Turkey and Greece distanced themselves from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This attitude was also transferred, at least in part, to Russia after 1989/90. Admittedly, this did not preclude the fact that politicians of the political left in Greece saw advantages in rapprochement with Moscow, and in some cases still do today, and that Turkey tried to play off NATO by moving closer to Russia from 1964 to 1979 (Axt 2015b; Steinbach 1979, 98–196). Indisputably, Turkey’s development as an energy hub in transporting mainly Russian gas increased its dependence on Russia, and Ankara furthered this development by purchasing Russian military technology. One can also speak of conflict-laden Turkish–Russian cooperation in Syria. As for dependence on Russian gas for transportation, that would only be countered if Turkey gained significant access to its own energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and could thus replace Russian gas with its own. From what we know so far, however, this is hardly a realistic perspective (Schenk et al. 2010). It is true that Russia is also somewhat dependent on Ankara, as Turkey is needed as a corridor for gas transport to Europe. Greece does purchase natural gas from Russia, but it does not act as an energy hub, which means a loss of revenue on the one hand but also reduces dependence on the other. Even though Greece’s relationship with the US has cooled in the past, Athens resisted the temptation to secure more support from Washington by moving closer to Russia. The Russian war against Ukraine consolidated this position. Greece is currently intensifying its security policy cooperation with the US. In May 2022, Greece ratified a new Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) with the US. The port of Alexandroupolis plays an important role in enabling US arms deliveries to Ukraine. In addition, the US is supplying modern fighter jets to Greece (Michalopoulos 2022).
As China is holding back on political or even security intervention in the Eastern Mediterranean and concentrating on economics, one might assume that a relationship of interdependence has developed between China and the Mediterranean states. But that would hardly do justice to reality. While economic cooperation provides mutual benefits, Chinese investments in often critical infrastructure sectors of many Eastern Mediterranean states are too significant not to speak of donor dependency. This dependency is tamed, however, by the fact that China currently resists the temptation to expand dependency relations beyond the economic dimension. The future will show whether this is going to remain the case in the long term as well. That financial dependency may be critical is heard less often in the countries receiving the Chinese investments, but leading NATO representatives such as its secretary general Jens Stoltenberg emphasise the aspect of system competition when China’s investments in critical infrastructure are declared to be of concern. Stoltenberg said on 30 November 2021:
But at the same time, we need to realise that yes, China is, in many ways, far away, but China matters for our security […]. They are investing heavily in our critical infrastructure as a way to interfere in our societies. And using our dependence on essential supplies to further their interests. (Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 2021)
The Strategic Concept adopted by NATO in June 2022 has reaffirmed the critical view of China (NATO Strategic Concept 2022, 5). The global rise in interest rates, the massive increase in energy prices and weaker growth are already making it difficult for many developing countries to service the loans they have taken out from China. If the call for a debt cut grows louder in this context, it can have serious consequences for the entire international financial system (Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch 2022). Economic cooperation, the reasoning goes, cannot ignore the competition between the Western systems and the Chinese model. The fact that China did not unequivocally criticise Russia’s war against Ukraine and prevented a corresponding condemnation of Russia with its veto in the UN Security Council shows the rapprochement of the two authoritarian powers. The Chinese representative abstained from the vote in the UN General Assembly. China has adopted Moscow’s narrative that the cause of the war is NATO’s eastward expansion and wants to maintain the strategic partnership with Russia as well as limit the consequential damage of Russia’s war on economic relations with Europe. In 2021, China’s exports to Russia amounted to 59.5 billion US$, to the US 521 billion US$ and to Germany 103 billion US$ (Workman 2022). It is not in China’s interest to enter into a long-term confrontation with Russia against the West. On the other hand, the more the Russian president relies on China’s support, the more he becomes its junior partner.
In the case of the EU, it can be assumed that many states in the Eastern Mediterranean are in a dependency relationship. The access to the EU market is of elementary importance to them. This also applies to the various support measures offered by the EU: in the case of member states, for example, in the form of agricultural and structural policy transfers, and in the case of non-members, through special programs (European Commission 2021). Again and again, however, this dependency is breaking. In the debt crisis, Greece also received financial aid from the eurozone because the monetary union itself was in danger if the Greek debt burden could not be alleviated. Even if protesters in Athens felt they were taking orders from Brussels and especially from Germany, it is hardly possible to deny interdependence. And in the case of non-EU members like Turkey, mass migration has shown that coping with it is hardly feasible without Ankara. In 2016, the European Council and Turkey reached an agreement aimed at stopping the flow of irregular migration via Turkey to Europe. According to the EU–Turkey Statement, all new irregular migrants and asylum seekers arriving from Turkey in the Greek islands whose applications for asylum have been declared inadmissible should be returned to Turkey (Corrao 2022). The readmission statement between the EU and Turkey attests to interdependent elements.
Will this interdependence increase if natural gas production in the Eastern Mediterranean makes progress and Europe becomes dependent on these resources? Based on all that is known so far, scepticism is warranted regarding the actual (!) opportunities for marketing the resources. The EU is aware that conflicts in its immediate neighbourhood also threaten its own stability and security. This is why various neighbourhood initiatives have been launched; basically, copying the approach that integration promotes balance and stability, as has been the case in Western Europe since the early 1950s (European Commission 2022). In the meantime, however, it must be acknowledged that copying Western European integration has had little positive effect in the case of the Mediterranean countries. When it comes to the conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean, individual EU states such as France, Italy or Spain are calling for a more decisive EU position in favour of the affected EU members, but this has so far failed to gain consensus. Perhaps this is an indication that, in terms of security policy, the Mediterranean is not a priority (Lippert 2021).
A cautious conclusion can be drawn: the region is dependent on the global powers but limited by two factors: First, the global powers’ interests balance each other out, preventing individual global powers from exerting a dominant influence. Second, the region is important to the global powers, but not to the extent that they would dare to engage in conflict with other global powers there. China is expanding its influence by making offers that can hardly be refused. Russia is in the position of an attentive observer, concerned above all with keeping the influence of the West in check. Although the United States oppose the growing influence of China and Russia, it hardly sees the need or possibility to reject this influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. When it comes to China, the US is focused on the Pacific region, and when it comes to Russia, the US sees many other sources of conflict, such as in the Middle East, the Black Sea region, Southeastern Europe, or the Baltics, where the “Russian Bear” is staking its claims. So, the Eastern Mediterranean is not high on Washington’s agenda for containing Russia’s ambitions. The US is working to prevent Russia and China from tipping the regional balance in the Mediterranean in their favour, as Mehmet Yegin points out in his contribution. That leaves the EU. While it sees the need to stop limiting itself to “soft power”, the interests of individual member states in Mediterranean countries are too complex, so the EU is not assertive in its approach to conflict management. The fact that states such as Turkey perceive the EU as biased, because Greece and Cyprus are EU members and thus somewhat automatically receive solidarity from the EU, naturally makes it more difficult for the EU to assume the role of impartial mediator. But this does not sufficiently explain the observed passivity of the EU. It is the heterogeneity of interests on the part of the member states that plays a central role.
The more the US focused on China, the more this created a new situation in Europe: it cannot be ruled out that this may have encouraged Russia to bring about at least a partial reorganisation of Europe’s political architecture. To which extent the states of the EU will then be able to reject Russia’s ambitions in such a situation depends, above all, on the capacity of the security and defence policy of the EU. The EU, which has long proclaimed that it aims to be a global player, will have to follow its announcements up with deeds. This is also going to concern the domestically sensitive question of what role the nuclear potential of France, as well as that of Great Britain, should play if the nuclear screen of the US is withdrawn. In the new security strategy that is to replace the 2016 version, the EU will have to answer such questions. That the strategic concept of 2016 can no longer serve can be seen from the fact that in 2016 it was declared that “the EU and Russia are interdependent” (Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe 2016, 33). When it comes to security, the EU will have to address the immediate neighbourhood in the context of the world political power constellation, the quadrangle of which is defined by the poles the US, Russia, China and the EU. The EU will have a chance to fulfil its will for closer cooperation in security—which was reaffirmed with Russia’s war against Ukraine—only if the conditions for this are sustainably created in the member states. Then the Russian perception that the EU is not a serious actor because of its divergence of interests will be removed.
What applies to Europe also applies of course to the region of the Eastern Mediterranean. Here, the already initiated withdrawal of the US has created a vacuum that will allow Russia and China to gain more influence. Russia is still holding back and rather “observing” the situation, as Zaur Gasimov points out in his contribution. China focuses more on investment and trade, which admittedly finds its limits in the limited opening of the market in China. Even if Jens Bastian is rather reassuring in his analysis and argues that China is focused primarily on economic objectives, the question remains as to which extent Chinese investments and the resulting indebtedness of the Mediterranean states will give China more opportunities for political influence in the future. When it comes to the energy reserves of the Eastern Mediterranean, the desires of China and Russia are limited. Russia wants to contain competition from Mediterranean energy suppliers, but Russia and China also know that the exploitability of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean is limited up to now. But, as stated several times, Russia’s war against Ukraine has reshuffled the cards and has first of all strengthened the unity of the West and closed the ranks.
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